Watergate and the Crimes of the Powerful: A Critical Criminology Re-Examination

The Watergate scandal holds a prominent place in American political history and is often viewed as a unique event in which a single administration deviated from democratic norms and was held accountable. However, this narrative can obscure deeper, systemic issues. Critical criminology argues that Watergate reflects ongoing structural conditions that enable state crime, elite deviance, and the consolidation of power rather than being a one-time exception. Critical criminology examines Watergate as more than isolated misconduct, instead highlighting it as a consequence of deep-rooted social relations involving ideology, class, authority, and law. This approach frames Watergate as an opportunity to investigate how crime is defined, how power operates, and how the state inflicts harm.

Watergate as State Crime: Challenging the Myth of the "Rogue Administration"

Green and Ward (2004) define state crime as illegal or harmful acts by the state, its agencies, or officials in pursuit of state goals. Watergate fits this: the DNC break-in, misuse of intelligence, obstruction, and cover-ups were all coordinated by Nixon’s administration. Chambliss (1989) argued that state crime is often justified by appeals to national security or political stability. Nixon created the "plumbers" to stop leaks and undermine opponents, showing this pattern. In this context, illegal acts became normal and were seen as needed for national protection. This fits Cohen's (1993) notion of a "culture of denial," in which states excuse harmful acts through neutralisation techniques. Watergate should be viewed as a structural issue, not just about individual wrongdoing. It shows the state using its resources to wield power illegally.

The Political Economy of Crime, Class, Capital and the State

Critical criminology links crime to the political economy. Quinney (1977) said the state serves the upper class by defining crime in ways that protect capitalism. Watergate shows this relationship: Nixon’s actions included soliciting corporate donations, providing business protections, and abusing campaign finance. Clinard and Quinney (1973) saw elite deviance as more than personal action. It is a systemic feature of capitalism that lets elites act with impunity. The illegal corporate donations to Nixon’s campaign show the merging of economic and political power. This critical perspective, therefore, sees Watergate not as an outlier but as a foreseeable outcome of a system in which political elites routinely manipulate democratic institutions for their own benefit.

As we expand on the political economy's influence, it is equally important to interrogate how crime itself is socially constructed—particularly, who is designated as criminal and how such designations serve power. A key point in critical criminology is that crime is socially constructed. Box (1983) said offences by the powerful are often dismissed as "administrative errors," while offences by the poor are exaggerated and punished harshly. The first response to Watergate showed this: Nixon’s team downplayed the burglary and called the scandal politically motivated. Only constant investigative pressure forced the state to admit its crimes. Quinney’s (1977) idea of the "social reality of crime" fits here. He argued that powerful people and institutions define crime in ways that help themselves. Watergate illustrates this: the state controlled the story, hid misconduct, and discredited critics. Nixon’s pardon by President Ford shows the unequal way justice is applied.

Surveillance, Discipline, and the Authoritarian State

Foucault’s (1977) theory of surveillance and power applies to Watergate. The events used surveillance tools, intelligence gathering, wiretapping, and secrecy. This shows the state's reliance on surveillance to keep order and control. Still, Watergate shows the system’s fragility. The state used surveillance to gather power, but journalism, whistle-blowers, and Congress exposed these abuses. This supports Cohen’s (1993) view that state power is always challenged. Surveillance remains a major area of political conflict.

Organisation Culture and the Normalisation of Deviance

State crime rarely starts with just one person’s actions. Organisational cultures often normalise and excuse deviant behaviour. Vaughan (1999) called this the "normalisation of deviance." In Nixon’s administration, officials saw illegal acts as essential political strategies. The hierarchical structure of the White House and the emphasis on loyalty to the president. The hierarchical White House structure and focus on loyalty led to illegal acts. This supports Kramer and Michalowski’s (2005) "state-corporate crime" theory. It shows how organisational pressures and political goals combine to produce harm, a triumph for journalism.

However, critical criminology presents a more nuanced view of the media’s role. Hall et al. (1978) observed that the media typically disseminate elite ideologies and concentrate on street crime, yet Watergate represented a departure from this pattern. Media coverage of Watergate was shaped by political conflict, the symbolism of a president’s actions, and elite rivalry. Other state crimes, like covert interventions, police violence, or economic abuse, get much less coverage. Watergate showed the media’s selective reporting, the politics that make elite deviance newsworthy, and the failure to hold powerful individuals accountable, even after prosecutions. Reiman and Leighton (2017) characterised the justice system as a 'carnival mirror,' which magnifies the crimes of the poor while obscuring the harms committed by the wealthy.

Nixon’s pardon is the clearest case of bias. Low-level staff went to jail, but Nixon escaped charges. Critical criminology holds that the state protects itself and that justice favours the wealthy.  Watergate's legacy highlights the need to understand crime as deeply political and structural. Critical criminology encourages this broader analysis, arguing that events like Watergate demonstrate the persistent links between power and deviance.

REFERENCES

Box, S. (1983). Power, Crime and Mystification. London: Tavistock.

Chambliss, W. (1989). State-Organised Crime. New York: Longman.

Clinard, M. and Quinney, R. (1973) Criminal Behaviour Systems: A Typology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Cohen, S. (1993) ‘Human rights and crimes of the state: The culture of denial’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 26(2), pp. 97–115.

Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon.

Green, P. and Ward, T. (2004) State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption. London: Pluto Press.

Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. London: Macmillan.

Kramer, R. and Michalowski, R. (2005) ‘State-corporate crime: Wrongdoing at the intersection of business and government’, in Pontell, H. and Geis, G. (eds.) International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime. New York: Springer, pp. 241–270.

Quinney, R. (1977). Class, State and Crime. New York: Longman.

Reiman, J. and Leighton, P. (2017). The Rich Get Richer, and the Poor Get Prison. 11th edn. New York: Routledge.

Vaughan, D. (1999) ‘The dark side of organisations: Mistake, misconduct, and disaster’, Annual Review of Sociology, 25, pp. 271–305.